Federated and Differentially Private Learning for Electronic Health
  Records by Pfohl, Stephen R. et al.
Federated and Differentially Private Learning for
Electronic Health Records
Stephen R. Pfohl∗
Stanford University
spfohl@stanford.edu
Andrew M. Dai
Google Health
adai@google.com
Katherine Heller
Google Health
kheller@google.com
Abstract
The use of collaborative and decentralized machine learning techniques such as
federated learning have the potential to enable the development and deployment
of clinical risk predictions models in low-resource settings without requiring sen-
sitive data be shared or stored in a central repository. This process necessitates
communication of model weights or updates between collaborating entities, but
it is unclear to what extent patient privacy is compromised as a result. To gain
insight into this question, we study the efficacy of centralized versus federated
learning in both private and non-private settings. The clinical prediction tasks we
consider are the prediction of prolonged length of stay and in-hospital mortality
across thirty one hospitals in the eICU Collaborative Research Database. We find
that while it is straightforward to apply differentially private stochastic gradient
descent to achieve strong privacy bounds when training in a centralized setting, it
is considerably more difficult to do so in the federated setting.
1 Introduction
The availability of high quality public clinical data sets [1, 2] has greatly accelerated research into
the use of machine learning for the development of clinical decision support tools. However, the
majority of clinical data remain in private silos and are broadly unavailable for research due to
concerns over patient privacy, inhibiting the collaborative development of high fidelity predictive
models across institutions. Additionally, standard de-identification protocols provide limited safety
guarantees against sophisticated re-identification attacks [3–5]. Furthermore, patient privacy may be
violated even in the case where no raw data is shared with downstream parties, as trained machine
learning models are susceptible to membership inference attacks [6], model inversion [7], and training
data extraction [8].
In line with recent work [9, 10], we investigate the extent to which several hospitals can collaboratively
train clinical risk prediction models with formal privacy guarantees without sharing data. In particular,
we employ federated averaging [11] and differentially private stochastic gradient descent [12–14]
to train models for in-hospital mortality and prolonged length of stay prediction across thirty one
hospitals in the eICU Collaborative Research Database (eICU-CRD) [2].
1.1 Federated Learning
Federated learning [11] is a general technique for decentralized optimization across a collection of
entities without sharing data, typically employed for training machine learning models on mobile
devices. In the variant known as federated averaging, each entity trains a local model for a fixed
number of epochs over the local training data and transfers the resulting weights to a central server.
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The server returns the average of the weights to each entity and the process repeats. This satisfies an
intuitive notion of privacy, since no entity shares data with the central server or with any other entity.
However, federated learning alone provides no formal accounting for the privacy cost incurred via
the communication of local model weights with the central server.
1.2 Differential Privacy
Formally, a randomized algorithmM:D → Θ with domainD and range Θ satisfies (, δ) differential
privacy [15] if for any two adjacent data sets d, d′ ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ∈ Θ,
P (M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP (M(d′) ∈ S) + δ. (1)
In our case, the randomized algorithmM we consider is differentially private stochastic gradient
descent (DP-SGD) [14, 13]. Here, adjacent data sets d, d′ are defined by adding, removing, and
modifying the data for one record. This formulation can be informally interpreted as one where
the inclusion of a record does not affect the probability distribution over learned model weights by
more than a factor , where δ bounds the probability of the restriction not holding. Notably, this
notion allows us to bound and quantify the capability for an adversary to determine whether a record
belonged to the training data set, regardless of their access to auxiliary information [15].
In practice, stochastic gradient descent can be made differentially private if the record-level gradients
are clipped to a maximum L2 norm S and the Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ added to the
mean of the clipped gradients [13] over a batch of training data. The privacy loss over the procedure
may then be accounted for with the moments accountant [14, 13] and Renyi differential privacy [16].
In this setting, the privacy cost of a training procedure is fully specified by the noise multiplier σ/S,
the ratio of the batch size to the training set size, and the number of training steps [13]. McMahan et al.
[12] demonstrate that it is straightforward to formulate federated learning in a way that is conducive
to differentially private training if DP-SGD is used as the local optimization algorithm.
1.3 Related Work
Our work is most similar to Beaulieu-Jones et al. [9] in that they also investigate decentralized and
differentially private machine learning in the context of mortality prediction in the context of the
eICU-CRD, but use cyclical weight transfer [17] rather than federated averaging for distributed
optimization. Another related technique is split learning [18–20] where the layers of a neural network
are partitioned across several entities, enabling learning across entities that may contribute different
data modalities without exposing the raw data or the local network architecture. As an alternative,
recent work [21, 22] has proposed the use of differentially private generative models to publicly
release synthetic data with privacy guarantees.
2 Methods
All experiments are based on data derived from the eICU Collaborative Research Database [2], a
freely and publicly available intensive care database containing data from 139,367 unique patients
admitted between 2014 and 2015 to 208 unique hospitals. Each patient may have one or more
recorded hospital admissions, each composed of one or more ICU stays.
We make predictions at 24 hours into hospital admissions that last at least 24 hours. We assign binary
outcome labels for in-hospital mortality and prolonged length of stay if the patient dies during the
remainder of the hospital admission or if the admission last longer than 7 days, respectively.
To construct a training set for supervised learning, we first partition the set of admissions by hospital
and then split the data within each hospital by patient such that 80%, 10%, and 10% of the patients
are used for training, validation, and testing, respectively. We allow for multiple hospital admissions
per patient, but no patient exists in more than one partition within the same hospital. We retain all
hospitals with greater than 1,000 hospital admissions in its corresponding training data set. This
procedure produces a cohort of 65,509 labeled hospital admissions across 31 unique hospitals. The
incidence of in-hospital mortality and prolonged length of stay in the aggregate population is 7.3%
and 34.4%, respectively.
We construct a feature representation as a function of data recorded within each hospital stay up
to 24 hours into the stay. We extract all lab orders, lab results, medication orders, diagnoses, and
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Table 1: Comparison of model performance for local, central, and federated training without differen-
tially private training for each hospital and prediction task. Results shown are the estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for the AUC-ROC for local training and the relative difference in central and
federated AUC-ROC compared to local training. Bold indicates a statistically significant improvement
over local training on the basis of zero not being contained within the confidence interval for the
difference in the AUC-ROC relative to the local model.
Prolonged Length of Stay Hospital Mortality
Hosp. ID (N) Local Abs. AUC-ROC Central Rel. AUC-ROC Federated Rel. AUC-ROC Local Abs. AUC-ROC Central Rel. AUC-ROC Federated Rel. AUC-ROC
73 (4,381) 0.803 (0.761, 0.845) 0.018 (-0.005, 0.042) 0.030 (0.012, 0.047) 0.791 (0.693, 0.890) 0.049 (0.007, 0.090) 0.025 (-0.007, 0.057)
264 (3,875) 0.631 (0.571, 0.690) 0.058 (0.010, 0.106) 0.067 (0.021, 0.114) 0.846 (0.785, 0.908) 0.015 (-0.015, 0.046) -0.007 (-0.048, 0.034)
420 (3,167) 0.707 (0.648, 0.766) 0.038 (0.003, 0.073) 0.016 (-0.014, 0.046) 0.811 (0.729, 0.894) 0.036 (-0.006, 0.079) 0.019 (-0.017, 0.055)
338 (3,139) 0.648 (0.584, 0.712) 0.098 (0.047, 0.149) 0.105 (0.056, 0.154) 0.820 (0.722, 0.919) 0.042 (-0.011, 0.094) 0.047 (0.008, 0.085)
243 (3,026) 0.664 (0.595, 0.732) 0.035 (0.003, 0.068) 0.022 (-0.008, 0.052) 0.910 (0.864, 0.956) -0.006 (-0.035, 0.023) -0.025 (-0.066, 0.016)
458 (2,723) 0.739 (0.679, 0.798) 0.042 (0.006, 0.078) 0.039 (0.004, 0.075) 0.840 (0.754, 0.927) 0.049 (-0.034, 0.131) 0.030 (-0.034, 0.094)
167 (2,680) 0.773 (0.715, 0.831) 0.010 (-0.022, 0.042) -0.006 (-0.039, 0.028) 0.845 (0.777, 0.914) 0.031 (-0.016, 0.078) 0.012 (-0.023, 0.048)
300 (2,678) 0.718 (0.652, 0.783) 0.040 (-0.002, 0.082) 0.023 (-0.009, 0.055) 0.699 (0.557, 0.841) 0.051 (-0.014, 0.116) 0.042 (-0.027, 0.112)
443 (2,666) 0.700 (0.637, 0.763) 0.037 (-0.002, 0.075) 0.052 (0.013, 0.090) 0.881 (0.816, 0.945) 0.001 (-0.040, 0.043) -0.019 (-0.052, 0.013)
188 (2,591) 0.773 (0.716, 0.830) 0.014 (-0.021, 0.049) 0.011 (-0.022, 0.044) 0.850 (0.783, 0.917) 0.013 (-0.041, 0.067) -0.003 (-0.062, 0.056)
208 (2,484) 0.663 (0.595, 0.730) 0.090 (0.040, 0.140) 0.044 (0.010, 0.077) 0.717 (0.596, 0.838) 0.114 (0.007, 0.220) 0.061 (-0.037, 0.159)
252 (2,449) 0.802 (0.748, 0.855) 0.026 (-0.011, 0.063) 0.011 (-0.022, 0.044) 0.829 (0.738, 0.920) 0.049 (-0.024, 0.122) 0.037 (-0.040, 0.113)
199 (2,215) 0.760 (0.695, 0.825) 0.016 (-0.024, 0.056) 0.015 (-0.026, 0.055) 0.838 (0.758, 0.918) 0.033 (-0.023, 0.089) 0.023 (-0.020, 0.066)
122 (2,103) 0.681 (0.608, 0.755) -0.011 (-0.064, 0.042) 0.001 (-0.044, 0.046) 0.730 (0.605, 0.855) 0.049 (-0.014, 0.112) 0.045 (-0.010, 0.099)
176 (1,942) 0.696 (0.618, 0.775) 0.066 (0.007, 0.124) 0.056 (0.019, 0.092) 0.886 (0.819, 0.954) 0.039 (-0.009, 0.086) 0.039 (-0.003, 0.081)
281 (1,783) 0.620 (0.528, 0.712) 0.169 (0.093, 0.244) 0.084 (0.030, 0.137) 0.779 (0.605, 0.953) 0.101 (0.006, 0.195) 0.129 (0.005, 0.252)
411 (1,747) 0.726 (0.647, 0.806) -0.011 (-0.057, 0.035) -0.027 (-0.067, 0.013) 0.925 (0.875, 0.975) -0.039 (-0.107, 0.029) -0.010 (-0.048, 0.027)
413 (1,730) 0.709 (0.623, 0.795) 0.025 (-0.028, 0.078) -0.008 (-0.058, 0.043) 0.809 (0.668, 0.951) 0.062 (-0.045, 0.169) -0.146 (-0.303, 0.011)
449 (1,613) 0.801 (0.730, 0.872) 0.051 (0.014, 0.088) 0.052 (0.016, 0.088) 0.854 (0.777, 0.931) 0.031 (-0.016, 0.077) 0.014 (-0.019, 0.048)
394 (1509) 0.747 (0.666, 0.828) -0.024 (-0.084, 0.037) -0.012 (-0.051, 0.027) 0.896 (0.811, 0.981) 0.027 (-0.044, 0.097) -0.010 (-0.054, 0.033)
283 (1,478) 0.603 (0.508, 0.698) 0.084 (0.011, 0.156) 0.074 (0.012, 0.136) 0.807 (0.684, 0.929) 0.082 (-0.029, 0.192) 0.038 (-0.056, 0.132)
307 (1,433) 0.639 (0.543, 0.735) 0.001 (-0.070, 0.072) 0.025 (-0.034, 0.084) 0.857 (0.750, 0.964) 0.026 (-0.056, 0.108) 0.029 (-0.041, 0.098)
331 (1,397) 0.668 (0.499, 0.836) 0.091 (-0.020, 0.203) 0.065 (-0.007, 0.137) 0.431 (0.204, 0.658) 0.409 (0.076, 0.742) 0.308 (-0.028, 0.644)
148 (1,386) 0.791 (0.717, 0.866) -0.025 (-0.080, 0.029) -0.025 (-0.083, 0.032) 0.815 (0.566, 1.000) 0.062 (-0.102, 0.225) 0.031 (-0.067, 0.130)
345 (1,372) 0.688 (0.599, 0.778) 0.054 (-0.020, 0.128) 0.040 (-0.028, 0.109) 0.769 (0.605, 0.934) 0.086 (-0.066, 0.237) 0.080 (-0.067, 0.227)
417 (1,369) 0.716 (0.629, 0.804) 0.082 (0.018, 0.147) 0.054 (-0.007, 0.116) 0.687 (0.518, 0.856) 0.189 (0.018, 0.360) 0.048 (-0.071, 0.167)
165 (1,336) 0.635 (0.536, 0.735) 0.024 (-0.043, 0.092) 0.045 (-0.012, 0.101) 0.595 (0.425, 0.765) 0.337 (0.186, 0.487) 0.313 (0.175, 0.452)
248 (1,334) 0.730 (0.641, 0.819) 0.009 (-0.048, 0.065) 0.036 (-0.011, 0.083) 0.777 (0.559, 0.995) -0.012 (-0.099, 0.076) -0.033 (-0.081, 0.016)
416 (1,330) 0.739 (0.648, 0.830) 0.073 (0.012, 0.134) 0.050 (0.004, 0.096) 0.675 (0.391, 0.959) 0.203 (0.003, 0.403) 0.220 (0.048, 0.393)
110 (1,305) 0.673 (0.565, 0.781) 0.097 (0.001, 0.192) 0.075 (0.004, 0.147) 0.947 (0.871, 1.000) 0.008 (-0.017, 0.033) -0.028 (-0.079, 0.024)
183 (1,268) 0.746 (0.656, 0.835) 0.037 (-0.033, 0.108) 0.024 (-0.045, 0.093) 0.802 (0.627, 0.977) -0.018 (-0.126, 0.090) -0.002 (-0.059, 0.056)
active treatments, as well as the patient age at admission, gender, ethnicity, unit type, and admission
source. Lab results and age are binned into three and four bins, respectively. We aggregate over time,
assigning a one for each feature if it is observed anywhere in the admission prior to 24 hours and a
zero otherwise.
For all supervised learning tasks, we consider only logistic regression and feedforward networks with
one hidden layer. We perform model selection on the basis of the area under the receiver operating
curve (AUC-ROC) evaluated on the corresponding validation set following a grid search over relevant
hyperparameters. Model performance is reported as the 95% confidence interval of the AUC-ROC
on the corresponding test set derived via DeLong’s Method [23]. We similarly derive confidence
intervals for the difference in the AUC-ROC between models to facilitate model comparisons.2 The
Adam [24] optimizer is used in each case.
2.1 Experimental Design
We conduct a series of experiments designed to evaluate the relative benefits of centralized and
federated learning, and the associated privacy costs, over learning using only local data at each
hospital. We evaluate the following experimental conditions:
• Local training with no collaboration. We identify a high performing model for each
hospital using only data from that hospital following a grid search over learning rates, batch
size, and hidden layer size if the model is a feedforward network.
• Centralized training. We simulate the setting where all of the records are available in a
central repository, selecting the best global model on the basis of the performance on the
aggregated records and evaluate the model on the local data from each hospital.
• Centralized training with differential privacy. We modify the centralized training proce-
dure to use DP-SGD for optimization [13]. Here we additionally search over the discrete
grid of [0.1, 1, 10] for both the noise multiplier σ/S and the gradient clipping threshold S.
We assess privacy in terms of the  that results from training with a fixed δ = 10−5.
2It should be noted that this procedure produces a confidence interval for the difference in the AUC-ROC
between models, taking into account the correlated nature of the predictions made by two models.
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Figure 1: Trade-off between the differential privacy  and validation AUC-ROC for σ/S = 1.0,
S = 10.0 over a training procedure of 25 epochs.
• Federated learning. We employ the federated averaging algorithm described in McMahan
et al. [11]. For each round of federated learning, we conduct one epoch of training using
the local data at each hospital and then synchronize the weights across all hospitals with an
average. We maintain a record of the local performance at each hospital over the federated
learning procedure and perform local model selection on the basis of the best validation AUC-
ROC observed over the procedure. Model selection for the best federated hyperparameters
is determined on the basis of the best mean local validation AUC-ROC across hospitals.
• Federated learning with differential privacy. We repeat the federated averaging exper-
iment as previously described, but use DP-SGD as the local optimizer at each hospital,
similar to the algorithm described in McMahan et al. [12]. We experiment with fixed global
DP-SGD hyperparameters and with local hyperparameters selected independently at each
hospital. For the local hyperparameter search at each hospital, we use δ = 10−5, σ/S = 1,
and S selected log uniformly from [0.1, 1, 10], performing model selection on the basis of
the DP-SGD hyperparameters that maximize local AUC-ROC in ten epochs of training
without any collaboration. We then perform federated learning for ten rounds with the
selected local DP-SGD hyper-parameters.
3 Results and Discussion
Prior to experimentation with differentially private training, we aimed to establish the efficacy of
federated learning over centralized and local learning. We find that while there is often a benefit to
federated learning over local learning, often attaining an AUC-ROC comparable with that of central-
ized learning, the improvements are often not large enough to be rendered statistically significant on
the basis of the 95% confidence interval for the difference in AUC-ROC between either the central or
federated model with the corresponding local model (Table 1). In particular, centralized and federated
learning for prediction of prolonged length of stay improve on local learning for thirteen and twelve
hospitals, respectively, whereas centralized and federated learning only benefit mortality prediction
in seven and five cases, respectively.
When the records from all hospitals are aggregated for differentially private centralized training, it
is feasible to attain relatively strong privacy guarantees ( ≈ 1) if σ/S = 1.0 and S = 10.0 (Figure
1) with a relatively minor reduction in terms of the validation AUC-ROC at the end of training
(prolonged length of stay 0.763 vs. 0.73; mortality 0.876 vs. 0.832). When attempting to perform
federated learning in a differentially private manner, we find that even with DP-SGD hyperparameters
selected on the basis of local training, the models derived from differentially private federated learning
often perform poorly in terms of both AUC-ROC and , and that this effect is exacerbated for mortality
prediction (Table S1). It is likely that a practical tuning strategy for differentially private federated
averaging could be identified with further experimentation, but it is unclear if such a strategy would
generalize to similar data sets and prediction tasks. This is problematic, for both this and related work,
as neglecting to account for the privacy cost of model selection produces optimistic underestimates of
the privacy costs [25, 26]. In future work, it is of interest to conduct controlled experiments to directly
compare our approach to cyclical weight transfer [9] and split learning [18–20] to gain insight into
the relative efficacy of differentially private federated averaging over alternatives.
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283 1,478 0.539 4.307 0.533 0.300
307 1,433 0.563 2.788 0.344 17.944
331 1,397 0.483 17.387 0.710 2.988
148 1,386 0.557 4.481 0.255 1.633
345 1,372 0.597 12.883 0.607 0.214
417 1,369 0.620 3.545 0.606 4.578
165 1,336 0.667 4.307 0.439 4.094
248 1,334 0.533 0.639 0.579 2.596
416 1,330 0.642 27.024 0.444 19.941
110 1,305 0.647 4.636 0.337 11.508
183 1,268 0.554 0.307 0.405 0.396
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